Colombian citizens and the government have faced a harsh and violent threat for more than 40 years. The guerrillas and specifically FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) have plunged the whole nation into violence, terror and death from generation to generation. Having the civil population under menace, the Colombian government has to act prudently but also quickly to avoid terrorism to take the control of the forces. The state has had to deal with this complex and difficult trouble by combating FARC through the counterinsurgency (COIN), which implies allocating sufficient resources to success and developing policies to assure the supremacy of the government over all groups outside the law. This study investigates the history of FARC’s insurgency in Colombia, the qualitative essence of this insurgency’s transitional phases and the Colombian government’s strategy towards opposing FARC. The foremost idea, the validity of which is being explored throughout the course of this study’s entirety, as that it is specifically by continuing to adhere to the methodological provisions of an integrative counterinsurgency campaign that the government will continue to score successes in its struggle against this notorious organization. This change towards a better integrative strategy is represented by the shift from the Pastrana government to the Uribe government.