This thesis advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which I label “ephysicalism”. It takes a realist stance towards subjective conscious experience: there are some entities such that there is something it is like, intrinsically, to be one of them (Nagel 1974). Firstly, I argue for a physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, I reject the thesis that consciousness is a supervenient property and, in particular, Strong AI and computational functionalism. Thirdly, I reject HOT theories of consciousness, address the “unity of consciousness”, and discuss the “explanatory gap” (Levine 1983). Fourthly, I argue that consciousness is an emergent property of conscious entities: it is, with respect to the micro-constituents of the emergence base, an ontologically novel property with original causal powers. Fifthly, I criticise Chalmers' (1996) “zombie argument” and Kim's (2005) “supervenience argument”. Finally, I argue that phenomenal contents are physical properties, and discuss Jackson's (1982) “knowledge argument”.