The Colombian government introduced a capacity market to promote the diversification in the energy matrix, and protect users from high prices derived from dry seasonal events. Unfortunately, the flaws in the scarcity price definition- a mechanism that activates the capacity market obligation and sets a cap price for the spot market- have resulted in a market failure. Specifically, some generation plants have been forced to be unavailable because their variable costs are significantly higher than the scarcity price. This research presents an analysis and some possible alternatives fo the definition of the scarcity price in the Colombian Electricity market. An excel-based model was developed in order to analyse and compare different scarcity price definitions under three dimensions: i) Water management resources. ii) Penalty exposure of agents. iii) Change in prices for final demand. Results suggest that the proposed change in the scarcity price definition would induce to more efficient water management resources, and a reduction in the penalty exposure of agents. Complementary actions are recommended for policy makers in order to avoid some possible side effects of the implementation of a new scarcity price definition.